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Priest: The Right to Sue Under Section 1983

CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE RIGHT TO SUE UNDER SECTION 1983
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002)
Cheryl A. Priest*
Pursuant to a request made by Respondent Doe' for an affidavit of good
moral character from Petitioner Gonzaga University, Petitioners2 revealed
information about Respondent in apparent violation of the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA).3 FERPA prohibits the
federal funding of educational institutions that have a policy or practice of
releasing educational records to unauthorized persons.4 Respondent filed
suit in state court under various state law claims and included a request for
damages5 under 42 U.S.C. § 19836 for the alleged FERPA violation.7 A
jury found for Respondent on all counts, awarding him compensatory and
My thanks to my parents John and Rosalie Priest for their unwavering support, and to
Aaron Ainsworth for his unconditional belief in me.
1. Respondent "is a former undergraduate in the School of Education at Gonzaga University,
a private university in... Washington state." Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002).
"Washington at the time required all.., new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character
from a dean of their graduating college or university." Id.
2. Petitioners are Gonzaga University and their "'teacher certification specialist,"' Roberta
League. Id. Petitioner League overheard a student say that Respondent "engaged in acts of sexual
misconduct against" a female undergraduate student. Id. Petitioner League launched an
investigation and contacted the state agency in charge of teacher certification, identifying
Respondent by name and discussing the allegations against him. Id.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l). FERPA provides in relevant part:
*

No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein...)
of students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency,
or organization....
Id.
5. Respondent alleged violations of Washington tort and contract law. Gonzaga Univ., 122
S. Ct. at 2272.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Id.
7. Gonzaga Univ., 122 S. Ct. at 2272.
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punitive damages, including $450,000 on the FERPA claim." The
Washington Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that FERPA does not
create individual rights and, therefore, cannot be enforced under section
1983.9 The Washington Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision,
and ordered the FERPA damages reinstated.' The State Supreme Court
reasoned that while FERPA does not explicitly grant a private right of
action, its nondisclosure provision creates a federal right enforceable under
section 1983." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 2 and
in reversing the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, HELD, that
FERPA's nondisclosure provisions do not create individual rights, 3 and
accordingly that FERPA is unenforceable under section 1983.'4
Six years after Congress enacted FERPA, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that section 1983 actions may be brought against state
actors to enforce rights created by federal statutes as well as rights created
by the Constitution. 5 However, a plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal
statute cannot sue under section 1983 where "(1) 'the statute does not
create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of
§ 1983,' or (2) 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute
in the enactment itself.""' 16 In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman," the Court began its exploration of when a federal statute
would be deemed to have created private rights.'8
In Pennhurst, the Court examined whether the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDABRA)' 9 created
substantive rights in favor of the mentally retarded, and if so, whether the
Petitioner" violated those rights.2 Respondent, a resident of the
Petitioner's institution, a hospital and school for the developmentally
disabled, filed suit on behalf of herself and other residents of the institution
alleging that conditions at the institution were unsanitary, inhumane, and
8. Id.
9. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545, 549 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), rev d, 24 P.3d 390
(Wash. 2001), rev 'd 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002).
10. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 400 (Wash. 2001), rev'd, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002).
11. Id.
12. Gonzaga Univ., 122 S. Ct. at 2272.
13. Id. at 2278.
14. Id. at 2279.
15. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
16. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)).
17. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
18. Id. at 18-19, 28.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1999) (repealed 2000).

20. Petitioner was a facility for the care and treatment of the mentally retarded. Pennhurst,
451 U.S. at 5.

21. Id. at 6.
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dangerous,22 and accordingly that their rights under the DDABRA had been
effectively denied. 23 The Court held that nothing in the language, structure,
or purpose of the DDABRA revealed a Congressional intent to require
states to bear the burden of funding new, legislatively created, substantive
rights for the developmentally disabled.'
In making this determination, the Court first noted that the DDABRA
was voluntary and that states were given the choice of complying with its
conditions or forgoing federal funding. 25 Then, the Court looked to the
legislative purpose of the DDABRA, and found that rather than creating
rights and obligations, DDABRA was a "mere federal-state funding

statute.'26 The Court noted that the DDABRA was precatory,27 and

represented general statements of federal policy 28 rather than newly created
legal duties. 29 Essentially, the Court ruled that when legislation is enacted
pursuant to Congress' spending power, the typical remedy for state
noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of
action but an action by the federal government to terminate funds to the
state.30 Specifically, the Court ruled that unless Congress demonstrates an
unambiguous intent to confer individual rights, federal acts that give states
the choice between complying with the act or foregoing federal funding are
not a suitable basis for private enforcement under section 1983.3
The Court found an unambiguous intent to create private rights in
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n.32 In Wilder, Petitioners, a nonprofit
organization of public and private hospitals, brought a section 1983 action
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 11.

26. Id. at 18. The Court likewise noted that the legislation was enacted pursuant to Congress'
spending power and is, therefore, in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the states
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. Id. at 17. The Court reasoned that if Congress
intends to impose acondition on the grant of money,it must do so unambiguously. Id. Further, the
Court noted that the "plain language" of the section of DDABRA at issue contained no language
conditioning the receipt of federal funding on states meeting the recommendations set out in the act.
Id. at 23.
27. "Having the nature of prayer, request or entreaty; conveying or embodying a
recommendation or advice or the expression of a wish, but not a positive command or direction."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990).

28. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 13. For example, "It]he Federal Government and the States both
have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to any institutio[n] ... that-(A)
does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such
person; or (B) does not meet the following minimum standards ..... Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
6010(3)).
29. Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 18, 23.
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id.at 17, 28.

32. 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990).
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challenging the method by which Virginia reimbursed them 33 under the
Medicaid Act.34 Specifically, the Petitioners claimed that Virginia's
reimbursement rates were unreasonable and inadequate to meet the cost of
providing care to Medicaid patients.35 The Court held that the Medicaid
Act created an enforceable right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement
rates by health care providers under section 1983.36
The Court noted that the Medicaid Act was phrased in terms benefitting
healthcare providers, 37 and from this fact concluded that health care
providers were the intended beneficiaries of the Act. 38 The Court found
that the statutory language was cast in mandatory terms,3 9 and noted that
federal funds were expressly conditioned on compliance.40 The Court
stated that the "reasonableness" language of the Medicaid Act was not
overly vague, and noted that while a range of reasonable rates exist,
certainly some rates would fall outside that reasonable range. 4' Essentially,
the Court held that reliance on section 1983 was not foreclosed simply by
the existence of an administrative scheme designed to comply with the
Medicaid Act's regulations, and found no indication that Congress
intended42 the administrative procedure to replace private remedies.
The Court further added the requirement of explicit rights-creating
language to benefit a putative plaintiff under section 1983 in Blessing v.
Freestone." In Freestone, the Court focused on the statutory language
necessary to create individual rights.45 Respondents, five Arizona mothers,
alleged that they had properly applied for child support services under Title
33. Id. at 501.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. V 1982). Specifically, the Wilder Court looked at whether the
Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which requires reimbursement according to the "rates that
a 'State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to
meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities,"' is
enforceable under section 1983. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 501-02 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A)
(Supp. V 1982)).
35. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503.
36. Id. at 509-10.

37. Id. at 510.
38. Id.
39. Id. at512.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 519-20.

42. In fact, prior to the passage of the Boren Amendment, Congress required states to waive
any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for violations of the Medicaid Act. Id. at 517. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-1122, at 4 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649-51. While the waiver
was later repealed, Congress explained that it did not intend the repeal to constrain the rights of
providers of these services to seek relief in state or federal courts. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 517; see also
S. REP. No. 94-1240, at 4 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5651.
43. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 523.
44. 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).
45. See id. at 341-46.
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IV-D of the Social Security Act (SSA), 6 and that the state agency 4 had
failed to take adequate steps to obtain child support payments from the
fathers of their children. 48 Respondent mothers claimed that the agency's
failure49 was attributable to certain structural defects," the existence of
which were in violation of Title IV-D.5' Pursuant to the SSA, if a state fails
to "substantially comply" with Title IV-D, the Secretary is authorized to
penalize the state by reducing its Aid to5 Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) 52 grant by up to five percent. 1

The Court noted that this "substantial compliance" standard was
designed only to guide a state in structuring its system-wide efforts to
enforce child support obligations, not to provide a private enforcement

mechanism. 54 The Court did not foreclose the possibility that some
provisions of Title IV-D may give rise to individual rights. 55 Finding too
tenuous a link between staffing guidelines and individual rights, 5 the
Court held that unless a plaintiff can point to a specific provision
conferring a specific right, a section 1983 claim cannot stand.57
Accordingly, the Court held that if Respondents could single out a specific
provision giving rise to an individual right, the right to sue under section
1983 could not be foreclosed by any alternative remedial scheme contained

46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669(b) (Supp. 111994).
47. Arizona Department of Economic Security. Freestone, 520 U.S. at 337.
48. Id.
49. The Court noted that Arizona's record of child support enforcement is "less than stellar."
Id. at 335. For example, the Court noted that in the 1989-1990 fiscal year, the state failed to collect
enough money in child support payments and federal incentives to cover even the cost of
administering its Title IV-D program, "1of only 10 states to fall below that target." Id. Moreover,
"[for every dollar spent on enforcement, the State collected barely two dollars-almost half the
nationwide average." Id.
50. Such defects included: staff shortages, high caseloads, unmanageable backlogs, and
deficiencies in the State's accounting methods and recordkeeping. Id. at 337.
51. Id. The structure of each state's agency must conform to federal guidelines set forth in
Title IV-D, including the creation of separate units to administer the plan, § 654(3), and
disbursement of collected funds, § 654(27), each of which must be staffed at levels set by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. § 303.20 (1995). In addition, to maintain
detailed records of pending cases, states must set up computer systems that meet federal standards,
§ 654(a), as well as enact laws designed to streamline paternity and child support actions, §§
654(20), 666. Id. at 334-35.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2000).
53. Freestone, 520 U.S. at 335.
54. Id. at 344. For example, the guidelines do not give rise to individualized rights to either
computer services or sufficient staffing. Id. at 344-45.
55. Id. at 345.
56. Id.
57. Id. "[T]o give each and every Arizonan" an individualized right to adequate support staff
and the like, especially without guidance on what would be considered sufficient, would "certainly
'strain judicial competence."' Id.
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within the statute.58
In an attempt to clear up confusing language in Freestone,59 the instant
Court expressly rejected the notion that anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right will support a cause of action under section
1983. The instant Court emphasized that it is rights, not benefits or
interests, that can be enforced under that section.6" In defining what kinds
of statutes create individual rights the instant Court, like the Court in
Pennhurst,2 seized upon the fact that FERPA was enacted pursuant to
Congress' spending powers.63 The instant Court noted that they had only
twice found spending legislation that gave rise to enforceable rights."
Distinguishing Wilder,65 the instant Court noted that the language of the
Medicaid Act, unlike the language in FERPA, specifically conferred rights
upon healthcare providers by requiring that the entitlement be bestowed on
individual healthcare providers.66 The instant Court reasoned that for a
statute to create private rights, its text must be 'phrased in terms of the
persons benefited."' 67 The instant Court noted that the initial inquiry in a
section 1983 case is no different than the initial inquiry in an implied right
of action case: determining whether a statute confers any right at all.68
Using this logic, the instant Court asserted that where the text and structure
of a statute provide no indication that Congress intended to create new
individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit under section 1983 or
under an implied right of action case.6 9
The instant Court held that FERPA is devoid of "rights-creating"
language."0 The Court reasoned that FERPA's provisions speak only to the
Secretary of Education, directing what the Secretary should do if an
educational institution has a prohibited policy or practice of releasing
students' information to unauthorized persons.7 ' As such, the instant Court

58. Id. at 348. The Court noted Title IV-D contained no private remedy, either judicial or
administrative, through which aggrieved persons could seek redress. Id.
59. "Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff." Id. at
340.
60. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002).
61. Id.

62. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
63. Gonzaga Univ., 122 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
64. Id. at 2273; see also Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418
(1987); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
65. 496 U.S. 498.
66. Gonzaga Univ., 122 S.Ct. at 2274.
67. Id. at 2275 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690, 693 n.13

(1979)).
68. Id. at 2276.
69. Id. at 2277.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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noted that the focus of the statute is "two steps removed"' from the
interests of individual students. 7 Additionally, the instant Court likened
FERPA to the statute in Freestone, as it has an aggregate focus, since
FERPA refers to a "policy or practice."'74 As in Freestone,the instant Court
noted that the fact that FERPA requires only "substantial compliance" is
an indication that the statute was intended to serve as a mere guide for the
state.75
Moreover, the instant Court reasoned that the enforcement mechanism
that guides the Secretary of Education through a specific set of procedures
to "deal with" non-compliant institutions is further evidence of a lack of
individual rights. 76 The centralization of control in the hands of the
Secretary of State, rather than regional offices,' provided even more
support to the instant Court that the statute was not intended to create
individual rights. 78 Judicial determinations would result in the multiple
interpretations Congress sought to avoid.79
The instant Court, by placing emphasis on the inquiry of whether a right
is unambiguously conferred in a statute by looking at the provisions of the
statute, appears to simplify the issue."0 By narrowly focusing the inquiry on
the express intent of Congress, many rights may not be recognized. The
laws, and their complex purposes, may prove too many and too diverse for
courts to discern what Congress considers an unambiguous intent to confer
a right.8 Most problems in statutory interpretation lie in what a court will
find sufficiently unambiguous.8 2
Beginning with Pennhurst, the Court found that nothing in the
language, structure, or purpose of the DDABRA revealed a Congressional
intent to require states to bear the burden of new, legislatively created,
substantive rights.8 3 At least an argument could be made that since the
72. Id. Specifically, the instant Court compared the language in Titles VI and IX ("'no person
shall be subjected to discrimination') with the direction to the Secretary of Education in FERPA,
noting that there would be less reason to infer a private right in favor of individuals if Congress had
written it simply as a ban on discrimination, without the "person" language included. Id. (citation
omitted in original).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2278.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 2278-79.
77. Id. at 2279. The instant Court reasoned that the centralization of control was an effort to
avoid multiple interpretations for FERPA. Id.
78. ld.
79. Id.

80. See id. at 2275.
81. See id. at 2279 (Breyer, J., concurring).
82. See id.at 2281 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting numerous interpretations of this and
other statutes).
83. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 6
FLORIDA L.4W REVIEW

[Vol. 55

"BRA" of DDABRA stands for Bill of Rights Act, there was at least a
modicum of Congressional intent to create express rights." Instead, the
Court, similar to its action in the instant case, broke each section of the
statute down into individual
components and analyzed whether any right
85
had been conferred.
FERPA contains ten subsections, many of which contain specific
references to both students' rights, parents' rights, and privacy rights.86 Yet
87
the instant Court focused its inquiry on a single provision of that statute
which provides that no funds will be made available to any institution
deemed to have a policy of releasing information about a student unless
that policy requires that the institution first obtain written consent from the
student's parents. 8 While the majority focuses on the institutional policy
language,89 finding it consistent with an aggregate focus rather than an
individual focus, 9° it does not appear to address the use of the "student" or
"student's parent."' The majority appears to refer to an individual student
in the same way the instant Court addresses the use of the term
"individual" in other rights-creating statutes.92
Additionally, the instant Court appears to stray from the tradition of
surveying the legislative history of the statute to determine if it creates
enforceable rights as it has done in previous cases. 93 This lack of an indepth inquiry into the legislative underpinnings may be representative of
the instant Court's emphasis on unambiguous and express Congressional
word choice. 94 If extended to other cases, this emphasis on pure language
may curtail the common practice of ascertaining legislative intent.
The instant Court does follow previous rulings in its determination that
"substantial compliance" language in FERPA speaks in terms of
institutional policy rather than individual instances of disclosure. 95 The
instant Court appears to suggest that if an individual right were to be
created by Congress, Congress would certainly intend that the states make
more than merely a good faith effort to "substantially comply" with such

84. The Court in Pennhurst, however, noted that "[i]t has long been established that the title
of an Act 'cannot enlarge or confer powers."' Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 19 n. 14 (1981) (quoting United States v. Oregon & California R. Co., 164 U.S. 526,541 (1896)).
85. See id. at 13-14; see also Gonzaga Univ., 122 S.Ct. at 2282.
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; see also Gonzaga Univ., 122 S. Ct. at 2281.
87. See Gonzaga Univ., 122 S. Ct. at 2273.
88. See id.
89. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91. See Gonzaga Univ., 122 S. Ct. 2268.
92. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
94. See Gonzaga Univ., 122 U.S. at 2275.

95. Id. at 2278; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 344 (1997).
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rights.96 Thus the instant Court remains intellectually consistent with it
previous rulings. 97
The most curious aspect of the instant Court's analysis of FERPA lies
in its inclusion of the centralized administrative procedure for redressing
grievances."' In Freestone, the Court, noting that if individual rights were
to exist they could be foreclosed by an enforcement scheme that makes a
section 1983 action unnecessary," appears to have imported the separate
inquiry previously applied to enforcement into the initial inquiry of
whether individual rights exist at all. 0 0 If the enforcement scheme of
legislation is to become a part of the determination of whether a right
exists, and not whether it is enforceable, as previously held,'0 then
previous cases'0° become less useful in guiding the courts through the
analysis of when individual rights are created. 3
While the instant Court may have created an easier test for Congress to
follow in the future when they intend to create rights, it may have also
muddied the water by collapsing two previously separate inquiries'" into
one comprehensive scheme for determining whether a Congressional act
creates individual rights, enforceable under section 1983.1°5 Nonetheless,
the right result may have been achieved, given the administrative headache
of potential suits for such minor events as teacher evaluations, honor
society recommendations, or roll call responses." 6 In the end, Congress
may have to choose its words more carefully.

96. See Gonzaga Univ., 122 U.S. at 2278.
97. See, e.g., Freestone, 520 U.S. at 344.
98. See Gonzaga Univ., 122 U.S. at 2278-79.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See Gonzaga Univ., 122 U.S. at 2283 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See, e.g.. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
See Gonzaga Univ., 122 U.S. at 2283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See Gonzaga Univ., 122 U.S. at 2278.
See id. at 2280 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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